


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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1. USSR: Report on Khrushchev farewell interview with British Ambassador. (*Page i*)




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5. India - Communist China: Border situation is static. (*Page vii*)

6. Communist China: Agriculture declines steadily in past four years. (*Page viii*)

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### DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR: (Khrushchev used his recent farewell interview with British Ambassador Roberts to set forth what were probably intended to appear as his minimum conditions for a Berlin settlement. It is likely that this represents his first step toward preparing for an eventual resumption of Berlin negotiations.)

(He asserted that bilateral US-Soviet talks had reached agreement on German frontiers, the existence of two Germanies, and the status of Berlin, and that the only remaining issue is the stationing of troops in West Berlin.)

(Khrushchev made it clear that he would not object to the continued presence of Western forces in the city if an agreement were reached to place them under United Nations authority. He claimed that the US had indicated willingness to consider a change in the legal status of West Berlin and that the status of Western forces, therefore, was now the only point at issue. He seemed to imply that the USSR would not insist on a formal abolition of the "occupation regime" and that an agreement to place Western troops under the UN flag, thus giving them an "international appearance," would satisfy this long-standing Soviet demand.)

(Khrushchev confided that he had planned to go to the UN with this proposal and then sign his separate

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(peace treaty. Ambassador Roberts commented that Khrushchev may have intended to convey the impression that he still might proceed along these lines, although he would prefer to reach a prior agreement with the West.)

(The Soviet premier concluded that there was now little scope for further compromise on the Soviet side. He reiterated that a peace treaty would be prepared which would confirm the existence of two German states, but he made no reference to a deadline for signing such a treaty.)

(In discussing other issues, Khrushchev indicated that after the completion of Soviet and US nuclear tests, a test ban agreement could be signed. He reaffirmed Moscow's desire for a comprehensive agreement covering underground as well as atmospheric, high altitude, and underwater tests and indicated interest in the concept of unmanned automatic seismic stations. In contrast to his 7 November statement that the Soviet test series would end on 20 November, he said that his experts insisted on testing a "new scientific method" and, therefore, the series would not be completed until early December or "certainly" before the end of the year.)

(Khrushchev expressed the view that measures to prevent surprise attack and to liquidate foreign military bases might now meet with better understanding in light of the Cuban crisis. He also indicated interest in a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement.)

(He called for a solution of the "Taiwan question" and for the admission of Communist China to the UN. The British ambassador's suggestion that this was not

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(the most propitious moment for pressing these Chinese issues produced only a wry smile from Khrushchev and Gromyko.)

(Khrushchev characterized his agreement with President Kennedy on Cuba as a reasonable compromise and an example of peaceful coexistence. He contended that the USSR had fulfilled its obligations by removing the missiles and nuclear warheads. He said President Kennedy should now terminate the blockade and guarantee respect for Cuban sovereignty.)

(When the British ambassador raised the IL-28 issue, Khrushchev claimed these aircraft were obsolescent and were about to be scrapped when his Marshals suggested sending some of them to Cuba as a response to President Kennedy's request for authority to call up 150,000 reservists. He argued, however, that this was not a serious issue and repeated the assertion that the USSR had already fulfilled its obligations.)

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India - Communist China: No military action of any consequence has been reported during the past 24 hours.

A new note of protest charging "outrageous" discrimination against Chinese Communist diplomatic personnel in India was delivered to the Indian chargé in Peiping on 13 November. The Chinese complained of restrictions on the movement of embassy and consulate officials, forced closure of the two Bank of China branches in India, and what Peiping called "frantic persecution" of Chinese nationals.

The private secretary of Y. B. Chavan, 48-year-old Chief Minister of Maharashtra State, states that Chavan has been selected as new defense minister. Chavan will assume the post as soon as his replacement is named in Bombay.

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Communist China: Japanese newsmen reported on 9 November that Foreign Minister Chen Yi told them that in none of the four years from 1959 through 1962 did agricultural output reach the 1957 or 1958 level.

Chen's statement would mean that grain output this year is below the 185 million tons reported for 1957--the last year for which Peiping's agricultural statistics are believed to have been fairly reliable.

Although grain imports for domestic consumption are running at about six million tons a year, approximately three to four times this amount would be necessary to return per capita grain availabilities to the 1957 level.

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Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma apparently is making plans to carry out his recent threat to resign unless support is forthcoming from the rival factions in the coalition government.

25X1 [redacted] Souvanna is drafting a letter of resignation which he intends to submit when "the moment is right." Souvanna has indicated, however, that he would delay any action until he confers with Deputy Premier Souphannouvong. Souvanna hopes that the Pathet Lao leader, who has just returned from visits in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, will give assurances that the Pathet Lao will adopt a more cooperative attitude. 25X1

[redacted]

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

(The United States Intelligence Board, on 9 November, approved the following national intelligence estimates:

(SNIE 13/31-62: "The Short-Term Outlook and Implications for the Sino-Indian Conflict" 25X1

(SNIE 85-4-62 : "Castro's Subversive Capabilities in Latin America" 25X1

(Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of USIB approval and the printed text within five days)

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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